Employment Research Newsletter
Volume 22

Number 3

Article 3

7-1-2015

Employment Research, Vol. 22, No. 3, July 2015

Follow this and additional works at: https://research.upjohn.org/empl_research

Citation
W.E. Upjohn Institute. 2015. Employment Research. 22(3). https://doi.org/10.17848/1075-8445.22(3)

This title is brought to you by the Upjohn Institute. For more information, please contact repository@upjohn.org.

JULY 2015

Marta Lachowska and Michał Myck
In this issue . . .
Marta Lachowska and Michał Myck

What Is the Relation
between Public Pensions
and Private Savings?
Carolyn J. Heinrich

The Role of Performance
Management in Good
Governance and Its Application
in Public Education
New and Noteworthy Books
Upcoming Conference
Vol. 22, No. 3
Employment Research is published
quarterly by the W.E. Upjohn Institute for
Employment Research. Issues appear in
January, April, July, and October.
The Institute is a nonprofit, independent
research organization devoted to finding and
promoting solutions to employment-related
problems at the international, national, state,
and local levels. The Institute is an activity
of the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee
Corporation, which was established in 1932
to administer a fund set aside by Dr. W.E.
Upjohn, founder of the Upjohn Company, to
conduct research on the causes and effects
of unemployment and seek measures for the
alleviation of the hardships suffered by the
unemployed.
W.E. Upjohn Institute
for Employment Research
300 S. Westnedge Avenue
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-4686
(269) 343-5541
www.upjohn.org
Randall W. Eberts
President

ISSN 1075–8445

What Is the Relation
between Public Pensions
and Private Savings?
P

ension systems where current
pension benefits are financed by current
revenues, also known as pay-as-you-go
systems, are vulnerable to demographic
changes such as increased longevity and
declining fertility. In part because of
lower birth rates in the United States, a
2014 Social Security Board of Trustees
report projects that by 2033, the costs of
Social Security programs will increase
so that revenues will pay for only about
77 percent of scheduled benefits (U.S.
Government Printing Office 2014).
To deal with such demographic
changes, over the past 20 years many
European countries, including Italy,
Poland, Sweden, and Germany, have
reformed their pension systems (see,
for example, Szczepański and Turner
[2014]). A common theme of pension
reforms has been to change the design
of future pensions in order to encourage
people to work longer and save more
for retirement. Such reforms provide
an opportunity to estimate whether, in
response to lower future pensions, people
save more on their own, or, equivalently,
to answer whether pay-as-you-go public
pensions crowd out private saving. The
public pension crowd-out is an important
policy parameter, because it tells us how
much people would save on their own if
Social Security benefits were lowered.

The 1999 Pension Reform
To answer whether public pensions
crowd out private saving, in a recent
Upjohn Institute working paper,
Lachowska and Myck (2015) study
Poland’s 1999 pension reform, which
created a setting similar to a “quasiexperiment.” The reform lowered future
pension benefits but had a different
impact on individuals, depending on their
year of birth. Individuals who were older
than 50 at the time of the reform were not
directly affected. However, those who
were between 30 and 50 years old at the
time of the reform will receive pension
benefits computed according to a less
generous postreform pension formula.
Figure 1 shows the median
replacement rate, defined as the ratio of
the first pension benefit of the head of
household to his or her last preretirement
salary, before and after the reform for the
cohorts affected and unaffected by the
reform. Prior to the reform, many could
expect a replacement rate of about 60
percent. After the reform, the replacement
rate for the cohorts unaffected directly by
the reform remained the same; however,
the replacement rate for the cohorts
affected by the reform fell by about 20
percentage points. We use the arbitrarily
set cutoff at age 50 to identify whether
this drop in pension generosity led to an
increase in the private saving rate.
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Figure 1 Median Replacement Rate Before and After the Pension Reform
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NOTE: Replacement rate is defined as the ratio of first gross pension benefit to last gross salary of
the head of the household.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using BBGD 1998 and 1999.

We want to stress that this quasiexperimental variation is valuable
because a person’s future pension
benefits depend on one’s earnings, and
the determinants of earnings are in
turn likely to be correlated with how
much one saves. Hence, because of
unaccounted-for confounding factors that
affect both earnings and savings, simply
comparing the savings of somebody
with a high future pension to the savings
of somebody with a low future pension
may not isolate the effect of pension
on saving. However, by comparing the
saving rate before and after the reform
and across similarly aged people—some
of whom were affected by the reform
and some of whom were not—we can
identify the effect of the change in
pension generosity on the saving rate.
Methods
To estimate the responsiveness of
private savings to pensions, we use
data from the Polish Household Budget
Surveys for years 1997–2003. We begin
by estimating multiyear “differencein-differences” regressions comparing

2

household saving before and after the
1999 reform for the cohorts affected
and unaffected by the reform. These
comparisons tell us how much the
saving rate changed because of the
reform. In a second step, we estimate
the change in PLN (Poland’s currency)
of the private saving rate for a change
of 1 PLN in pension wealth—that is, the
public pension crowd-out. To do this,
we compute what the pension wealth
would have been under the prereform
and postreform legislation and relate this
variable to saving. As before, we use
the fact that the 1999 pension reform
changed the amount that similarly aged
people could expect to receive in public
pensions.
Figure 2 shows the point estimates
from a multiyear difference-indifferences regression using the saving
rate as the dependent variable. The point
estimates show the difference in the
saving rate of the households affected
by the reform relative to the saving
rate of households unaffected by the
reform and relative to year 1998—the
year preceding the pension reform. In
order to interpret the point estimates

as effects of the reform on the saving
rate, we should not see any statistically
significant differences in the rate between
the households affected or unaffected
by the reform in the years preceding
the reform. If we do, we would worry
about preexisting group and time trends
in saving rates that would confound the
estimated effect of the reform. However,
in the years following the reform, we
expect to see an increase in the saving
rate of the households whose expected
pensions were reduced by the reform.
We see from Figure 2 that in 1997,
relative to the unaffected households
and relative to the year 1998, there was
no statistical difference in the saving
rate of the cohorts later affected by the
reform. That the saving rate in 1997 is
not different for the cohorts affected
and unaffected by the 1999 reform
strengthens our claim that differences
in the saving rate between the cohorts
observed after 1999 really are an effect
of the reform. The saving rate tends to
increase over time in the years following
the reform for the cohorts whose pensions
were reduced relative to the cohorts
who were unaffected by the reform and
relative to the prereform saving rate.
This suggests an effect of the reform in
the expected direction. The magnitude of
the estimated effects on the saving rate
in Figure 2 is between 0 and less than
5 percentage points, which is a large
increase, given that the average saving
rate in our data is about 2 percent and the
median saving rate is about 9 percent.
Key Findings
How does the change in the saving
rate reported in Figure 2 relate to the
degree of public pension crowd-out?
In our working paper (Lachowska and
Myck 2015), we report the following key
findings:
 Our analysis shows that public
pension crowds out private saving by
about 0.24 PLN for each 1 PLN.
 For older cohorts (born between
1949 and 1953), middle-aged cohorts
(born between 1954 and 1968), and
people with a higher education, we find a
large and statistically significant crowdout ranging between 0.45 and 1.0, which
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to the predictions of the classical
life-cycle model; therefore, limited
financial literacy should be taken into
consideration when designing pension
reforms.

Figure 2 Estimated Effect of the 1999 Pension Reform on Saving Rate
0.1

Note
1. For example, Attanasio and Brugiavini
(2003) report a range of effects between 0.30
and 0.70; Attanasio and Rohwedder (2003)
report the crowd-out to be between 0.65
and 0.75; and Bottazzi, Jappelli, and Padula
(2006) estimate it to be 0.70.
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NOTE: The figure shows point estimates from a multiyear difference-in-differences regression of
saving rate on an indicator for whether the household is affected by the reform, i.e., whether the
household is “treated,” six-year dummies, and an interaction term between the year dummies and
the “treated” dummy. The figure presents the interaction point estimates over time. The omitted
categories are year 1998 (the year just before the reform) and the cohort born 1937–1948 (the
cohort unaffected directly by the reform). The regression uses robust standard errors clustered
by year of birth, and the figure presents 95 percent confidence intervals. The dashed vertical line
indicates the first year of the reform.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations using BBGD.

implies that, for these groups, private
saving and pensions are close to perfect
substitutes.
 Younger cohorts (born after 1968)
and lower-educated households display
much smaller public pension crowd-out.
Policy Implications
A crowd-out of 0.24 suggests that
public pensions displace a sizable
part—about one-quarter—of private
savings. However, compared to other
recent studies, our estimate of crowdout is at the lower end of the range of
existing estimates.1 Also, our subsample
analysis reveals that this crowd-out is
not uniformly distributed in society, but
rather is concentrated among certain
types of households. If the goal of
pension reforms is to increase private
saving, policymakers should be aware of
the heterogeneity in the responsiveness

of saving to pension reforms. Simply put,
some households might increase their
saving in response to benefit cuts, while
other households might not save enough.
We speculate that the nonresponse
among the younger households could be
due to liquidity constraints, incomplete
information, or uncertainty about how
enduring the 1999 reform would be.
For young people, building up a stock
of wealth might simply be a question
of time, and as they age they may
accumulate more saving. However, the
lack of a savings response observed
for the less-educated households is
worrisome and echoes the findings of the
financial literacy literature. The concern
is that by remaining passive and not
adjusting their saving, these households
are at risk of having a low standard
of living in retirement. One policy
conclusion from the passive behavior
of the low-educated households is that
all households do not behave according
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Carolyn J. Heinrich

The Role of Performance
Management in Good
Governance and Its
Application in Public
Education
This article draws from the author’s
chapter in The Political Economy of Good
Governance (Asefa and Huang, eds.), which
was recently published by the Upjohn
Institute. To order the book, visit www.upjohn
.org/up_press, or see p. 7 for more details.

G

overnance—laws, rules, judicial
decisions, and administrative practices
that prescribe and enable the provision of
publicly supported goods and services—
determines government performance
(Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill 2001). The role
of performance management, in turn,
is to shape how public sector agencies,
programs, and activities are organized
and managed to achieve public purposes
and desired outcomes.
The origins of performance
management lie in a basic agencytheory framework, where an owner hires
managers and workers to generate profits
(with the owner or manager acting as
principal, and the workers as agents).
The principal’s main objective is to
design a contract that aligns principal
and agent incentives and achieves the
principal’s production objectives. This is
made challenging, however, by the fact
that these relationships are frequently
typified by conflicts in goals and values,
as well as privately held information or
information asymmetries.
It is here that a role for performance
management enters in, in monitoring
worker actions, outputs, and outcomes,
and in developing an incentive scheme
that aligns principal and agent interests—
essentially, a contractual relationship
with performance expectations and
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credible provisions for enforcing it.
However, even in a simple production
system—where organizational goals
and production tasks are known, a linear
relationship exists between efforts and
outputs, and there are relatively few
variables for managers to control—an
enforceable contract is difficult to
achieve.
One well-known problem is
adverse selection, where employees’
true motivations or capabilities for
producing a desired outcome are
unknown. The second is moral hazard
and unobservability, in which employees’

Effective performance
management demands clarity
of goals and their translation
into empirical measures that
adequately characterize
our intended outcomes.
efforts or actions are not observable or
readily measured, creating conditions that
encourage shirking or distorted results.
Recent headlines reporting cheating
scandals in K–12 schools—under
pressure to meet performance targets on
standardized tests set by the No Child
Left Behind (NCLB) Act—are just one
example of how these problems can
undermine performance management
efforts (Rich 2013).
Yet many contracts and performance
management systems still incorporate
basic linear (or “straight-line”) incentive
schemes, largely because of their
perceived simplicity and the significant

costs of establishing a more intricate
contract or system of incentives. A
straight-line approach typically defines
a required (linear) rate of performance
improvement from an initial score or
target and may also specify an ending
value corresponding to a maximum
performance level, such as NCLB’s goal
of 100 percent proficiency in reading and
mathematics for public school students
(see Figure 1). NCLB also provides an
example of an important shortcoming
of straight-line models for establishing
performance expectations: they are
seldom constructed using empirical data
that would generate realistic expectations
for performance (Koretz and Hamilton
2006). In fact, Secretary of Education
Arne Duncan acknowledged that the
performance management system under
NCLB evolved “from an instrument of
reform into a barrier to reform” (U.S.
Department of Education 2013, p. 1).
From the start, the application
of agency theory to the design of
performance management systems in
the public sector has been complex.
First, just who is the principal in a given
governance setting? Governance in
the public sector is multilayered and
dynamic. In addition, consensus or
clarity on goals is often lacking among
citizens, and sometimes in originating
legislation as well. The public sector
is also distinctive in that its primary
work typically involves complex,
nonmanual work, characterized by
multilevel interactions and public-private
sector partnerships. Nonstandardized
outputs make the accurate measurement
of performance and construction
of performance benchmarks more
challenging and more costly. Finally,
the public sector is also distinct from
the private sector in the extent to which
political influences may be brought to
bear at many different levels. Goals
and priorities can change swiftly, and
entire agencies or authority structures
can be reorganized, as well as the foci of
primary work. There is great potential for
unintended consequences as performance
management and the use of performancebased contracts expand into uncharted
public-sector territory (Koning and
Heinrich 2013).
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Figure 2.1 Annual Expectations Set by the No Child Left Behind Act for Increased
Performance among Students in Grades K–8 Tested in Math, 2002–
2014 (% that must be met of students testing at the “proficient” level)
100
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NOTE: The figure shows the expected percentage of students each year that should achieve a rating of “proficient” in testing for math under the legislation. The bar for 2002, the first year the
law was in effect, shows the actual percentage of students who tested as proficient in math that
year, and no improvement was required for the first year following that. But thereafter, increasing
percentages of proficiency were set for each year, culminating in 2014, when 100 percent of kindergarteners through eighth graders were expected to be proficient in math. (The exception was
2006, when the expectations were not raised from 2005.)
SOURCE: Author’s compilation.

Applying Performance Management
Bluntly in Public Education
We spend close to $600 billion
annually on our public elementary and
secondary school system, and the public
is demanding greater accountability and
results. Furthermore, public education
today is characterized by elaborate
governing structures with deeply layered
and overlapping levels of decision
making, widely varying views on
appropriate means and ends for improving
education, an increasingly complex
technology with diverse outputs (which
we subject to standardized measures of
outcomes), and political influences that
interject at many levels. Could the use
of performance management potentially
bring some clarity and coherence to K–12
education governance?
We have proceeded full speed
ahead with regimes for performance
management and accountability in
education that include strong incentives
and high-stakes consequences for

many stakeholders. NCLB marked the
beginning of an assertive federal role
in directing state and local practices to
meet student performance standards.
The federal government holds states,
districts, and schools accountable for a
comprehensive set of standards, including
annual academic progress, teacher
quality, and achievement gaps, and
for developing assessments of student
performance relative to those standards.
NCLB defines educational success
primarily based on standardized tests
of students’ performance, and current
funding and accountability systems
presume “same-age cohorts of students
proceeding in lockstep” (Wilson 2013,
p. 96). Consistent with the origins of
performance management, DarlingHammond (2002, p. 6) describes how
our test-based accountability system
reflects a “factory-model approach” to
education, in which schools are organized
“to process large batches of students
in assembly-line fashion rather than to
ensure that students are well-known

by their teachers and treated as serious
learners.”
Recently, recognition of the limitations
of proficiency measures under NCLB
has propelled alternative approaches to
measuring educational performance,
particularly value-added measures. A
basic value-added model compares the
individual growth of a group of students
(e.g., in a given classroom or school)
to average growth of the population of
interest (e.g., growth among all students
in the state). Some value-added models
are also constructed to account for
factors outside the control of schools in
estimating growth in student achievement
over time. Although these are (arguably)
better measures of performance than
proficiency levels, should society be
ratcheting up the stakes that it attaches to
them, as we have recently seen in some
large, urban school districts?
One of the most controversial
recent developments in performance
management in education has been
the high-profile, public dissemination
of value-added measures of teacher
performance in large school districts,
including in Los Angeles and New York.
Calculated by third parties (outside
the district), the value-added measures
associated with specific teachers were
published in the Los Angeles Times and
by the New York City Department of
Education.1 The objective was to get
the performance information directly to
citizen stakeholders, who could use this
information and their political power
to drive public-sector performance
improvements.
However, in New York City, the
margin of error in value-added measures
was so wide that the average confidence
interval around each rating spanned 35
percentiles in math and 53 percentiles
in English, the city said. Some teachers
were judged on as few as 10 students.
In publishing the Los Angeles numbers,
the L.A. Times acknowledged that
value-added measures “do not capture
everything about a teacher or school’s
performance” (see Note 1). A study by
Mathematica Policy Research (Schochet
and Chiang 2010) finds that the error rate
for value-added scores (based on three
years of data) was 25 percent. Therefore,
a three-year model would rate one out
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of every four teachers incorrectly, and
with only one year of data, the error rate
jumped to 35 percent.
Lessons for Improving the Effectiveness
of Performance Management
What have we learned about the
role of performance management in
contributing to good governance and
improving government outcomes?
 The effective use of performance
management demands clarity of goals
and their translation into empirical
measures that accurately and adequately
characterize our intended outcomes.
Where we fail on either of these
components, the performance
management system may risk doing more
harm than good. In many cases, the data
available simply are not up to the task.
In light of these limitations,
and recognizing that performance
management often grapples with multiple
goals and complex production, we may
be better off with multidimensional
measures of performance to guide our
work. A number of school districts and
states are now developing these types
of multipurpose, multiple-indicator
performance management systems
for K–12 education (New York City
Department of Education 2014). A
potential trade-off, of course, is that a
more intricate or complicated system
and set of incentives would likely place
a greater demand on public capacities for
managing such a system.
 Caution should be exercised in
attaching high stakes to performance
results, given the known challenges
and imperfections of our performance
measures.
The awarding of performance
bonuses, “naming and shaming” (as
in the publication of teacher valueadded), termination of contracts, or
retractions of program funding would
best be backed or verified by multiple
sources of quantitative and qualitative
evidence before going forward. A
counterargument frequently offered
against eliminating high stakes altogether
is that the performance management
and incentive systems will lose their
“teeth” and purpose. Evidence to date,
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however, suggests that individuals and
organizations are highly responsive
to performance standards, even when
the rewards are minimal, such as peer
recognition (Bevan and Hood 2006;
Heinrich 2007).

Koning, Pierre, and Carolyn J. Heinrich.
2013. “Cream-Skimming, Parking, and Other
Intended and Unintended Effects of HighPowered, Performance-Based Contracts.”
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management
32(3): 461–483.

 Performance management systems
are likely to be more effective tools of
governance if we focus more on their use
for diagnostic purposes.
That is, resources and rewards should
follow their effective use in improving
government and program outcomes,
rather than for hitting performance
targets. In the public education example,
schools or teachers would be rewarded
for using information on students’
performance to help increase their
learning, ideally measured in terms
of their individual growth that is not
based solely on test score levels or
gains. This would be a more appropriate
outcome to report publicly (for the
sake of transparency), and, if measured
sufficiently, would also reward the right
types of efforts to increase performance,
that is, not success in increasing testtaking skills but rather effective use of
performance information to help students
succeed academically.

Koretz, Daniel M., and Laura S. Hamilton.
2006. “Testing for Accountability in K–12.”
In Educational Measurement, Robert L.
Brennan, ed. 4th ed. American Council
on Education–Praeger Series on Higher
Education. Westport, CT: Praeger, pp. 531–
578.

Note
1. See http://projects.latimes.com/value
-added/ and http://www.schoolbook.org/
2012/02/24/teacher-data-reports-are
-released (accessed June 10, 2015).

References
Bevan, Gwyn, and Christopher Hood.
2006. “What’s Measured Is What Matters:
Targets and Gaming in the English Public
Health Care System.” Public Administration
84(3): 517–538.
Darling-Hammond, Linda. 2002.
“Standards, Assessments, and Educational
Policy: In Pursuit of Genuine Accountability.”
The eighth annual William H. Angoff
Memorial Lecture, presented at the
Educational Testing Service, Princeton, NJ,
October 30.
Heinrich, Carolyn J. 2007. “False or Fitting
Recognition? The Use of High Performance
Bonuses in Motivating Organizational
Achievements.” Journal of Policy Analysis
and Management 26(2): 281–304.

Lynn, Laurence E. Jr., Carolyn J. Heinrich,
and Carolyn J. Hill. 2001. Improving
Governance: A New Logic for Empirical
Research. Washington, DC: Georgetown
University Press.
New York City Department of Education.
2014. Performance and Accountability.
New York: New York City Department
of Education. http://schools.nyc.gov/
Accountability/default.htm (accessed October
16, 2014).
Rich, Motoko. 2013. “Scandal in Atlanta
Reignites Debate over Tests’ Role.” New York
Times, April 3, A:13. http://www.nytimes
.com/2013/04/03/education/atlanta-cheating
-scandal-reignites-testing-debate.html?_r=0
(accessed September 17, 2014).
Schochet, Peter Z., and Hanley S. Chiang.
2010. Error Rates in Measuring Teacher
and School Performance Based on Student
Test Score Gains. NCEE Report No. 20104004. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Education, National Center for Education
Evaluation and Regional Assistance.
U.S. Department of Education. 2013.
No Child Left Behind: Early Lessons from
State Flexibility Waivers. Testimony of
Secretary of Education Arne Duncan to the
U.S. Senate Committee on Health, Education,
Labor, and Pensions, February 7. 113th
Cong. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of
Education. http://www.ed.gov/news/speeches/
no-child-left-behind-early-lessons-state
-flexibility-waivers (accessed October 16,
2014).
Wilson, Woodrow. 1887. “The Study of
Administration.” Political Science Quarterly
2(2): 197–222.
Carolyn J. Heinrich is the Sid Richardson
Professor of Public Affairs and affiliated professor
of economics and the director of the Center for
Health and Social Policy at the University of Texas
at Austin.

New and Noteworthy Books
The Political
Economy of Good
Governance

NEW

Sisay Asefa and Wei-Chiao Huang, Eds.
Governance refers to the process of
governing and includes the actions of
all the stakeholders involved, including
formal governmental bodies, citizens,
lobbies,
l
and
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political
parties.
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power
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development,
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and
D
Done
right,
g
governance
leads
tto a ffruitful
itf l cooperation
ti among citizens
and their governments. Done wrong, it
can lead to domestic and international
turmoil, environmental degradation,
and economic malaise.
A new book from the Upjohn Press
considers several dimensions of good
governance, while also warning of the
deleterious effects that may arise from
its absence. The authors explore the
political economy of good governance
and how it relates to performance
management, the influence of political
parties, education and health issues in
developing countries, the economic
performance of transition economies,
and the effects of climate on poverty.
As the contributors to this book
show, in a world where countries
continue to struggle with poverty;
poor health, sanitation, and education
systems; corruption; and an overall
lack of economic opportunity, adopting
the principles of good governance may
serve as a means of improving the lives
of those in need.
173 pp. 2015
$40 cloth 978-0-88099-497-2
$15 paper 978-0-88099-496-5

What Does the
Minimum Wage Do?
Dale Belman and Paul J. Wolfson
 Winner of the William G. Bowen
Award from Princeton University’s
Industrial Relations Section
This book from the Upjohn Press
helps settle the issue of what are the
iimpacts of raising
tthe minimum
w
wage. Based on
a rigorous metaaanalysis of more
tthan 200 scholarly
ppublications
ppublished since
1991 (most after
22000) that address
tthe various impacts
off raising
wage, What
i i the
h minimum
i i
Does the Minimum Wage Do? presents
the most comprehensive, analytical, and
unbiased assessment of the effects of
minimum wage increases that has ever
been produced. Authors Dale Belman and
Paul J. Wolfson look at several outcomes
influenced by increases in the minimum
wage, how long it takes those outcomes
to respond, the magnitude of effects, why
increases in the minimum wage have the
results they do, and the workers most
likely to be impacted.
Their painstaking analysis focuses
mainly on studies using data from the
United States, but also includes studies
that focus on Canada, Australia, New
Zealand, the UK, and other western
European nations. This breadth and
depth of investigation on the impacts
of hikes in the minimum wage clarifies
the issues surrounding, among other
things, employment, wages, poverty and
inequality, and effect by gender.
471 pp. 2014
$55 cloth 978-0-88099-457-6
$35 paper 978-0-88099-456-9

Upcoming Conference
“Revisiting the Promise
and Problems of
Inner City Economic
Development”
September 15–16, 2015
Detroit, MI
You are invited to attend an
inner city economic summit
featuring new research, discussion,
and practitioner experience on
inner city growth, development,
and competitiveness.
The summit will feature a
keynote address by Harvard
Business School Professor Michael
Porter, as well as a number of
ssessions
hhighlighting
nnew research
aand discussing
ppractitioner
eexperiences
oon various
aspects of inner city bbusiness and
workforce development. A tour and
site visit on September 15th will
offer participants an opportunity
to experience how the three levers
of growth (business environment,
clusters, and individual firms) are
promoting or failing to promote
economic development within
Detroit’s inner city. Participants
will also see how the collaboration
of organizations is driving
economic activity (midtown
Detroit) and where the lack of
collaboration is hindering economic
activity (northeast Detroit).
The summit is hosted by the W.E.
Upjohn Institute for Employment
Research, the Initiative for a
Competitive Inner City, and the
Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
For an agenda and details on
how to register, please visit http://
www.icic.org/urban-economic
-development/2014-inner-city
-economic-summit, or contact
Claudette Robey, Economic
Development Quarterly, robey@
upjohn.org or (269) 385-0469.
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